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Direct Examination of Medical Experts
in Actions for Death and
Bodily Injuries
Charles T. McCormick*
The subject of this discussion is direct examination of medi-
cal experts in actions for death and bodily injuries. Lawyers
may be most interested in the practical and the tactical approach,
law professors and physicians in how the practices of lawyers
and courts in this area should be reformed, but I shall emphasize
chiefly in this discussion some of the rocks of legal doctrine
which the lawyer in planning the examination of his experts
should keep in mind in charting his course.
CONFERENCE WITH EXPERT
Of course the investigation of legal doctrine is only a part
of the preparation stage. Another and more important part is
the lawyer's conference with the medical expert whom he
expects to place on the stand. The doctor must be educated
about the legal restrictions on medical evidence, and the lawyer
must be taught about the medical aspects of his case. Dr. Gannon
of Washington, D.C., has this interesting comment on the prac-
tices of younger and older lawyers in this respect. He says:
"My employers, during the past 40 years in and out of
court, have been mostly the defendants and my most satis-
factory experiences as a medical witness have been with the
younger and less experienced members of the legal profes-
sion. The reason for this has been that the youngsters are
trying to learn, they are trying to get the viewpoint of the
doctor, trying to understand cause and effect. Sometime
before the trial they confer with the medical witness and
learn what he thinks and why he has arrived at certain con-
clusions .... As the lawyer attains experience and reputation
he apparently feels that these conferences are no longer
necessary and they are not held. The result is that the medi-
* Professor of Law, University of Texas.
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cal witness who has carefully prepared his testimony is not
allowed to give it in a consecutive and detailed manner. He
has not had an opportunity to reflect and consider the ques-
tions which the attorney thinks to ask. Misunderstanding of
the object of the questions arises and I think cases are lost
because of these circumstances." '
QUALIFICATIONS
The first impact of legal rules upon the lawyer's examina-
tion is through the standards of qualification of medical experts.
Here the demands of good advocacy and the standards of legal
qualification present a black and white contrast. The proper
maxim for the advocate is "costly thy expert as thy purse can
buy," and in a case of difficulty the attending physician should
be reinforced by a specialist. For example, to quote Dr. Gannon
again, "a general surgeon should not interpret an x-ray film for
the jury. X-ray discussion belongs to the roentgenologist. It is
not the business of the general surgeon. If he should succumb
to the temptation to point out variations from the normal in an
x-ray picture, he may be followed on the stand by an expert
roentgenologist whose interpretation of the film may contradict
the testimony of the medical witness and the jury would prob-
ably be correct if it believed the roentgenologist." 2 Moreover,
the lawyer is entitled to show not merely the expert's bare quali-
fications to testify, but to examine him to reveal the special quali-
fications of training and experience, his honors and distinctions,
which entitle him not merely to testify, but to be believed by the
jury.3 Nor should the common tactic of the adversary, of "admit-
ting the qualifications" be ground for cutting off the proponent
from presenting his expert in the strongest light.
The legal rules of qualification, by contrast, require no more
in matters of medical science than that the expert witness be a
licensed physician, and even when the most difficult and elusive
scientific issues are involved, such as diagnoses of mental abnor-
mality, specialists are not required. This minimal standard,
though it is certainly not the best of qualification for scientists
in hospitals and research laboratories, is evidently thought to be
the only practical test for admitting experts under our adversary
system where the parties, and not the court, have the responsi-
1. Gannon, The Witness Stand as the Doctor Sees It, 15 J. of D.C. Bar
Ass'n 255, 261. 262 (1948).
2. Id. at 256.
3. Salmon v. Rathjens, 152 Cal. 290, 299, 92 Pac. 733, 737 (1907).
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bility for selecting and compensating those who are to testify in
court on scientific questions.
Moreover, the line is not even drawn at a medical degree.
Mr. Busch 4 tells us that medical students, osteopaths, and chiro-
practors have been held competent to testify as experts in the
fields of their particular knowledge and experience. The courts
will face difficult problems in delimiting the fields of expertness
of the licensed practitioners in the new pseudo-sciences of healing
recognized by law in many states. In a recent Washington case 5
the court was called on to construe a statute which authorized a
state board to license practitioners of mechanotherapy, suggestive
therapeutics, food science, physcultopathy, or "any other separate
system of drugless practice." Fortunately, the court announced
that "drugless healers cannot qualify as expert witnesses as to
matters in the general realm of medicine and surgery."
COURT'S DISTRUST OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Assuming that the expert has been selected, what are some
of the legal problems that may be encountered in the direct
examination? In general, I think the older attitude of judges
was that of a special distrust of expert testimony. As late as
1920 the Illinois court said, "it is the most unsatisfactory part of
judicial administration .. .the expert is often the hired partisan
and his opinion is a response to pecuniary stimulus." 6 This atti-
tude has by no means disappeared and is occasionally manifested
by a supertechnical treatment on appeal of the testimony given
on direct examination. An Ohio case 7 is an object lesson for the
examiner. There the plaintiff brought an action to recover for
illness and injuries suffered after eating peas bought at defen-
dant's store. The plaintiff called as witness the physician who
attended him at the time he became ill and who testified as
follows:
"Q. 'What did you diagnose his illness as, at that time?'
"A. 'I thought he had food intoxication, food poisoning.'
"Q. 'Dr. B., based upon your examination of the plaintiff in
this case ... what is your opinion as to the peas in that
4. Law and Tactics in Jury Trials § 430 (1949).
5. Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P. 2d 79, syl. 2 (1950).
6. Opp v. Pryor, 294 Ill. 538, 545, 128 N.E. 580, 583 (1920).
7. Scaglioni v. Oriti, 83 Ohio App. 351, 83 N.E. 2d 657 (1948), acutely
criticized in Note, 18 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 353 (1949).
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transaction having been spoiled and unfit for human
consumption?'
"A. 'Yes, I thought they were.'
"Q. 'Let me ask you what is your opinion as to the peas
being the cause of this plaintiff's illness at the time you
examined him?'
"A. 'Yes, I thought they were.'"
On appeal the court held that this testimony did not support the
verdict for the plaintiff, because the doctor only swore to what
he thought when he examined plaintiff and did not give his
opinion as of the time of trial.
PHYSICIANS EMPLOYED ONLY TO TESTIFY
Another manifestation of the judicial distrust of experts is
the set of rules in some states placing severe restriction upon
the testimony of doctors who have examined the plaintiff not
for the purpose of treating him as a patient, but for the purpose
of preparing himself to testify about his injury. Certainly it is
good practice and in furtherance of justice for parties to call in
such doctors, frequently specialists, to supplement the testimony
of the attending physician who is usually not a specialist and is
frequently an unpractised and inadequate witness. But the courts
in Texas, Illinois, Wisconsin and Washington and perhaps in
other states, by what seems a rather questionable rule, have
decreed that the doctor employed not to treat but to testify must
be limited to giving his opinion based solely on the objective facts
observed by him (or upon a hypothetical question), and is
barred from giving an opinion based even in part upon what the
patient told him about the history of his injury or his sufferings
and symptoms. 8 Accordingly one should warn his witness that
he must be prepared to state, if he truthfully can, that his opin-
ion is based solely upon his medical knowledge and what he
actually saw, without giving any weight to what the patient told
him about his condition. This puts an undue strain, I think,
on the veracity of the expert. A doctor in reaching an opinion
can and does discount the patient's statements considerably, but
8. Greinke v. Chicago City R.R., 234 Ill. 564, 85 N.E. 327 (1908); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wells, 207 S.W. 2d 693, syl. 1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947);
noted in 24 Texas L. Rev. 387 (1946); Peterson v. Department of Labor, 36
Wash. 2d 266, 217 P. 2d 607 (1950); Schields v. Fredrick, 232 Wis. 595, 598,
syl. 2, 288 N.W. 241, 242 (1939); Beckwith, Medical Evidence, 23 Wis. Bar Bull.
6, 10 (1950).
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for him to disregard them altogether in reaching a decision is as
impossible as for a jury to obey a judge's instructions to use a
,prior statement of a witness only to impeach and not as sub-
stantive evidence.
TREATISES
It would often be convenient if the attorney could suggest to
his doctor that, upon some point where the doctor's own experi-
ence is slight, he should fortify his opinion by reading brief state-
ments from a medical text or treatise which can often furnish
clear, picturesque and impressive passages. Nearly all courts
however will forbid such readings on direct examination, though
some will permit the doctor on direct to mention the name of a
text, as supporting his opinion, and many will permit the cross-
examiner to read from texts passages inconsistent with the wit-
ness's conclusionsY There are obvious arguments against the use
of treatises in jury trials, though I am not sure they should be
controlling, but in judge-tried cases without a jury it seems that
they should be freely usable in evidence, as far as the judge finds
them helpful.
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS OF OPINION
May the examiner, after having elicited the facts as to the
doctor's training and experience, and the fact that the doctor has
examined the injured party, proceed at once to the pay-off ques-
tion, such as, was the cerebral hemorrhage suffered by plaintiff
caused by the fracture of the skull, or has the plaintiff's arthritis
been aggravated by the injury? Must he elicit from the witness,
either beforehand or in connection with the question, a statement
of the facts and theories on which he grounds his opinion, or is he
permitted to leave this task to the cross-examiner if he chooses
to do so? As a matter of legal requirement this is a disputed
question. Wigmore and some of the courts say "yes," he can leave
that to the cross-examiner,10 but many courts, perhaps the major-
ity, say that the grounds of opinion must precede or accompany
9. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1700 (1940); Notes, Medical Books as Evi-
dence, 65 A.L.R. 1102 (1930); Medical Treatises, 12 So. Calif. L. Rev. 424
(1939). The court looked tolerantly upon an expert's reading from treatises,
and seemed to approve it in Coastal Coaches v. Ball, 234 S.W. 2d 474, 478,
479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). As to use on cross-examination, see Note, 82 A.L.R.
440 (1933).
10. 7 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1922. See also 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 675;
Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 29 Cal. 2d 492,
500, 175 P. 2d 823, 828, syl. 11 (1946).
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the conclusion." However, as a question of advocacy there will
usually be little doubt. The doctor's statement of his reasons is
the heart of his testimony, and usually his persuasiveness will
depend on how effectively he can explain why he reached his
conclusion. Occasionally, a lawyer will omit these questions as
to grounds, in the hope that the adversary on cross-examination
will choose to nibble at this hook. More often the direct exam-
iner will prefer to bring out the reasons on direct, because he
knows his opponent would steer clear of this sucker-bait.
OPINION BASED IN PART ON REPORTS OF TECHNICIANS
A rather tricky point as to grounds of opinion is raised in some
of the decisions, namely, whether the physician-witness may in
forming his conclusions rely upon the reports of technicians, or
hospital charts, when these have not been introduced in evi-
dence. Of course, he could not base his conclusions, upon the
opinion of another doctor on the whole medical issue even though
that had been received in evidence. He cannot simply add his
"me, too." But it is obviously standard practice for doctors in
making a diagnosis to rely on factual reports of technicians as to
tests of blood and urine, or hospital charts showing tempera-
tures, et cetera, in reaching a diagnosis. However some of the
cases, as in Missouri,' 2 for example, require these reports to be
in evidence if the witness is to use them as a basis for his Opin-
ion. The Wisconsin court more sensibly dispenses with this
requirement, 1" but if the question has not been passed upon in
the particular state in which the trial is held, it would seem
wisest to make sure that the reports to be relied on are put in
evidence.
Most of the problems thus far discussed involve risks which
can usually be rather easily avoided by careful planning of the
examination. Those which follow present inherent difficulties,
and hazards which can be lessened but not always entirely
avoided by preparation.
11. Note, 82 A.L.R. 1338, 1340 (1933).
12. Baumhoer v. McLaughlin, 205 S.W. 2d 274, syl. 5, 6 (Mo. App. 1947)
(x-ray picture and another doctor's report thereon). See also People v. Black,
367 Ill. 209, 10 N.E. 2d 801 (1937) (physician in charge of mental cases at
house of correction improperly permitted to give his opinion based partly on
observation and partly on reports of investigation by social workers, and of
examination by other physicians); People v. Keough, 276 N.Y. 141, 11 N.E.
2d 570 (1937).
13. Sundquist v. Madison Rys. Co., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392, syl. 4, 5
(1928); and see 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 688; Note, 175 A.L.R. 274, 285 (1948).
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HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS
The first of these is the web of restrictions hedging about the
use of hypothetical questions. Probably these restrictions look
more complex to one who examines the picture in the general
texts, encyclopedias, and digests, which present all the variant
rules, than to the lawyer who has only to conform to the practice
in a single jurisdiction. Even so, the fact is that most of the
recent decisions where problems of expert testimony are debated
turn on the technique of hypothetical questions, and this shows
the underlying difficulties in the use of this device. Moreover,
the hypothetical question is a comparatively ineffective way of
presenting the expert's conclusions to a jury. And a long one is
a real soporific! Reading a speech is bad, but how much enter-
tainment did the jury get from a question in a California court 14
which covered eighty-three pages of typewritten transcript, fol-
lowed by an objection covering fourteen pages?
There are two methods of framing -hypothetical questions.
The first, and the one which is customary in. most of the states, is
the familiar one in which counsel recites in the question the facts
which he desires the witness to assume and asks for his opinion
'based on these assumptions. One drawback of this practice is
that in some, probably a minority, of the states it is required
that the questioner recite as assumptions substantially all of the
facts in evidence material to the subject of the opinion sought.",
This "all the facts" rule tends to put pressure on counsel to
extend his question to such lengths as to be tedious and ineffec-
tive. Most courts, however, would require only that the facts
assumed should be a fair selection of data sufficient to form the
basis of a rational opinion.' 6
Anotherpitfall of the practice of reciting facts to be assumed
is the obviously necessary requirement that all such assumed
facts recited in the question must before the case is closed
actually be supported by evidence. Recent cases in which judg-
ments were reversed for failure to satisfy this requirement 17
indicate that careful advance preparation of the question, and
14. Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 243, 263, 228 Pac. 25, 35 (1924).
15. Mathiesen Alkali Works v. Redden, 177 Md. 560, 10 A. 2d 699, syl. 2, 3
(1940); Aasen v. Aasen, 228 Minn. 1, 36 N.W. 2d 27, syl. 12 (1949).
16. Moore v. Belt, 203 P. 2d 22, syl. 19, 20 (Cal. App. 1949); and cases cited
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 682, n. 2.
17. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Waters, 205 Ark. 87, 167 S.W.
2d 886, syl. 2, 3 (1943); State v. Barker, 128 W. Va. 744, 38 S.E. 2d 346, syl. 3
(1946).
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planning of the proof necessary to sustain the assumptions, are
essential.
The other method of propounding hypothetical questions is
to have the doctor sit in court and hear all or part of the testi-
mony, and then to ask him, "assuming the truth of all the testi-
mony in the case," or "assuming the truth of the testimony of
witness Jones, heard by you, will you give your opinion," as to
the cause of the plaintiff's condition, or the like. This method
gives an automatic guarantee that the requirement last men-
tioned, that the assumptions must be supported by proof, will be
satisfied. It appears to be frequently employed in Maryland,
Missouri, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin and recog-
nized as proper in many other states.'8 It seems that the counsel
planning to present expert testimony should always consider
this technique as a possible alternative, except in the few states19
where the method is disapproved. But this method, too, has its
pitfalls. If the witness is asked to assume the truth of the testi-
mony, and the testimony in fact is conflicting, then the question
is objectionable because it is ambiguous. The jury will not
know which of two conflicting stories the witness assumes to be
true.20 Moreover, if the testimony whose truth he is asked to
assume includes the opinion of another expert witness, the ques-
tion is held to be defective,2' though perhaps this should only be
condemned where the second witness is merely asked to echo or
rubber-stamp the opinion given by the other doctor.
Perhaps these conclusions about hypothetical questions can
be reached: First, they are to be avoided when possible. If all
of the expert's conclusions can be based upon his examinations
of the injured party, plus his training, reading, and experience,
there is no need or requirement that the question be couched
hypothetically.2 2 Second, when resort to a hypothetical question
is unavoidable, then for it to serve best its persuasive purpose, it
should be kept as simple as the rules of law will allow. Nearly
always if the doctor is to prove the causal connection between
some bodily condition of the plaintiff and the external happen-
18. See cases collected in Note, 82 A.L.R. 1460 (1933); and in 2 Wigmore,
Evidence § 681.
19. Note, 82 A.L.R. 1472, 1473 (1933) collects the cases.
20. Note, 82 A.L.R. 1478-1483 (1933).
21. Note, 82 A.L.R. 1489 (1933).
22. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 29 Cal. 2d 492,
500, 175 P. 2d 823, 828 (1946); 2 Wigmore Evidence § 675 (1940); Note, 82
A.L.R. 1338 (1933).
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ing for which the defendant is charged to be responsible, a hypo-
thetical question is essential, and it is in this area of proof of
cause that it is most often employed. One way of keeping it
simple is to question the doctor first concerning the facts which
he has found as to the plaintiff's condition from his observation
and examinations, and then to ask the hypothetical question,
somewhat like this: "In the light of these facts learned from
your examination, to which you have testified, and assuming
that the plaintiff fell twenty feet from a scaffold to a cement
sidewalk on January 2, 1952, and has not sustained any other
violence or injury, do you have an opinion as to the cause of the
present condition of his back?" This might not meet the require-
ments in the few states demanding that the hypothetical ques-
tion embrace all the facts but would seem to be otherwise
acceptable.28
INVADING THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY
Another doctrine which was once a great stumbling block
to counsel examining medical experts, particularly upon the issue
of causal relation between the injury and the disability, was the
rule against invading the jury's province. This rule has now been
liberalized in most states, by recognizing an exception for expert
testimony, even when it goes to the ultimate issue, when the
question to be resolved is a scientific one upon which the jury
needs the opinion of experts. 24 A few states, however, have
retained the prohibitory rule, as applied to expert testimony as to
cause, in a form so extreme that it is surprising that it should
ever have been seriously defended. This is the view that the
doctor may not testify that in his opinion the accident did cause
the present disability, but may only answer the question, "Can
you say whether in your opinion it could or might have caused
the injury?" As has been pointed out, this restriction is unfair
to the expert. If he answers yes, the jury may believe that his
opinion is no stronger than a belief in the possibility of causal
relation, whereas in fact the doctor may be convinced that the
23. The question is modeled on the situation and holding in Cobb v.
Spokane P. & S.R. Co., 150 Ore. 226, 44 P. 2d 731, syl. 3, 4 (1935). For other
cases holding that the question may embrace both facts assumed and facts
known by the witness, see Biddle v. Riley, 118 Ark. 206, 176 S.W. 134, syl. 6
(1915); George v. Shannon, 92 Kan. 801, 142 Pac. 967, syl. 1 (1914); Houston &
T.C.R. Co. v. Rutland, 101 S.W. 529, syl. 7 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907); 58 Am. Jur.
487; Note. 82 A.L.R. 1340 (1933).
24 Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W. 2d 646
(1942); 32 C.J.S. 75, n. 36. Cases on expert opinion as to cause of disability
are collected in Dec. Dig., Evidence, Key No. 528(1).
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accident was the cause, but is not allowed to say so. Moreover, if
he should answer no, it could not have been the cause, the answer
would offend the court's canon, for it would clearly be an
opinion on the issue. Nevertheless, some of the states, including
Illinois, Michigan and North Carolina, seem to retain this archaic
obstruction. 25 The following passage from an opinion by Federal
Judge Gardner in the Eighth Circuit stands in refreshing con-
trast and represents the prevailing approach:
"Dr. McBratney, who qualified as an expert, testified
that he had examined and X-rayed the plaintiff. Based upon
his examination and certain facts assumed from the testi-
mony in the record, he was asked his opinion as to the cause
of plaintiff's Condition. Similar questions were propounded
to Dr. Tibe. The court sustained objections to their testi-
mony on the ground that the answers called for would in-
vade the province of the jury. But if the questions pro-
pounded were such that the jury might not be capable of
determining from the evidence, then it was proper that they
should have the benefit of the opinion of an expert.... The
purpose of a trial is to investigate the facts so as to ascer-
tain the truth, and the' modern tendency is to regard it as
more important to get to the truth of the matter than to
quibble over distinctions which are in many cases imprac-
ticable, and a witness may be permitted to state a fact known
to him because of his expert knowledge, even though his
statement may involve . . . the ultimate fact to be deter-
mined by the jury." 28
CERTAINTY OF FUTURE CONSEQUENCES
Passing from cause to consequences, the interview and inter-
rogation of the doctor as to the future results of the injury
require careful handling. In the instructions the court will limit
the liability for future consequences such as future suffering and
new complications (such as blindness in an eye injury, the
spreading of an infection into new areas, or the necessity of a
future operation) to those consequences which are found to be
"reasonably probable." 27 Accordingly, testimony of the expert
25. Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City R.R., 272 Ill. 71, 77, 111 N.E. 499,
502 (1916); De Haan v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923, syl. 11 (1932);
Patrick v. Treadwell, 222 N.C. 1, 21 S.E. 2d 818, syl. 4-9 (1942).
26. Cropper v. Titanium Pigment Co., 47 F. 2d 1038, 1043, 78 A.L.R. 737
(8th Cir. 1931).
27. Note, 22 Texas L. Rev. 505 (1944).
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that these consequences "may" or "might" ensue may be rejected
as too speculative, or if admitted, may be held insufficient to
warrant an instruction submitting such item as an element of
damages.28
ADEQUACY OF GROUNDS OF OPINION
Finally, the party who plans to rely for part of his case upon
expert testimony must bear in mind that his expert's conclu-
sions, if they seem at all controversial, will have to run the
gauntlet of trial and appellate judges as to the adequacy of the
grounds for his opinion. Some examples of experts' conclusions
which passed or failed to pass this scrutiny may be of interest.
In a Minnesota case2 9 a woman bearing a child was injured
by the railway by a fall which, as it appeared, could have caused
peritonitis. Some time later she bore a child and, shortly after,
died. The facts did not show whether death resulted from peri-
tonitis following the accident, or from septicemia from child-birth
infection. The court held that such facts could only have been
ascertained by a post-mortem or microscopic examination, which
was not had, and that there was no adequate basis for the con-
clusion of plaintiff's experts that the death was caused by peri-
tonitis produced by the accident.
In an Illinois case 0 an action was brought on a policy for
the accidental death of the insured, a woman of thirty-four,
whose body was found floating on the surface of Lake Tahoe, near
a small boat she had rented. Nothing was known of the circum-
stances of death. So far as appeared, she had been in good
health. The insurance company defended on the theory that
death was due to disease, not to accidental drowning. The defen-
dant's doctor testified that the fact that the body floated tended
to indicate that the deceased was dead before her body reached
the water, and that her death might have resulted from chronic
myocarditis. Surprisingly enough the jury found this persuasive
and found for the defendant. The appellate court held, however,
that the expert's opinion was based purely on "guess, surmise,
and conjecture" and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment.
The third and last case was a death action brought by the
family of a husband and wife who as passengers were killed in
28. See Busch, Law and Practice in Jury Trials § 438 (1949).
29. Mageau v. Great Northern R.R., 106 Minn. 375, 119 N.W. 200 (1908).
30. Kanne v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 310 Ill. App. 524, 34 N.E. 2d 732
(1941).
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a rear-end collision of Southern Pacific trains in Utah. The
engineer of the overtaking train passed through two stop signals
just before he crashed into the train ahead. Live steam poured
into the cab where this engineer was and he was found dead
after the crash. The issue was whether the collision was due to
his negligence, and the railway's theory was that the engineer
was dead or unconscious before he passed the stop signals. As
an expert the defense produced a pathologist who had performed
about three thousand autopsies. He examined the report of the
autopsy upon the body of the engineer and his testimony was
largely based on the facts disclosed by the autopsy. "[H]e
expressed the opinion that cause of death was advanced coro-
nary arteriosclerosis. In reaching that conclusion he took into
consideration among other things the condition of the heart and
the condition of the skin, emphasizing that-live skin and dead
skin would have reacted differently to the steam which poured
into the cab of the engine immediately after the accident." With
the facts hypothesized, "the witness was asked whether in his
opinion as an expert death or disability of the engineer had
occurred at the time he failed to respond to the last stop signal
before the accident. The witness answered that on the basis of
the facts assumed in the question, it was his impression that the
engineer would have responded normally had he been mentally
competent at the time the red signal was seen." Presumably on
the basis of this evidence, the jury found for the defendant, and
on appeal the admissibility of the expert testimony was sus-
tained, and judgment for defendant was affirmed.3 1
Probably the first of these three cases, where the doubt was
between peritonitis and septicemia in childbirth, as the cause of
death, was one where adequate fact-investigation might have
enabled the plaintiff to furnish adequate grounds for a favorable
opinion. The second, the drowning case, was perhaps one where
the defendant refrained from gathering the facts, in the hope of
winning, as he almost did, on a speculative expert opinion which
might not have survived in the sunshine of actual facts. The
third case, the train collision, seems to show the mighty potency
of this combination: a careful preparation on the medical facts,
a highly qualified expert witness, a well-devised hypothetical
question, and persuasive advocacy at the trial and on appeal.
31. Francis v. Southern Pac. R.R., 162 F. 2d 813, syl. 6-8 (10th Cir. 1947).
